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In this paper we discuss the consistency concept of Williams coherence for imprecise con-
ditional previsions, presenting a variant of this notion, which we call W-coherence. It is
shown that W-coherence ensures important consistency properties and is quite general
and well-grounded. This is done comparing it with alternative or anyway similar known
and less known consistency deﬁnitions. The common root of these concepts is that they
variously extend to imprecision the subjective probability approach championed by de
Finetti. The analysis in the paper is also helpful in better clarifying several little investi-
gated aspects of these notions.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Quite recently, P.M. Williams’ 1975 seminal paper Notes on conditional previsions was published in a slightly revised ver-
sion [29], preceded by an introductory paper discussing basic aspects and historical motivations for his work [25]. This fact
conﬁrms that Williams’ ideas on coherence still play a very important role in the theory of conditional imprecise previsions.
In the past, they inﬂuenced the more widespread theory developed by Walley [26]. Williams coherence was also directly
used in some papers to achieve results in different areas, including epistemic independence [24], problems of checking con-
sistency for conditional imprecise probabilities [27], consistency for unbounded random variables [23]. Yet, certainly also
because of its overall limited diffusion in the scientiﬁc community, several aspects of Williams coherence are still little
explored.
A basic motivation for studyingWilliams coherence is its generality: in the version we present in the paper, it extends to a
very broad conditional setting Walley’s (unconditional) coherence, which already encompasses as special cases several
uncertainty theories (2-monotone probabilities, precise probabilities, belief functions, possibility/necessity measures, coher-
ent risk measures, ...) applied in many different areas, from artiﬁcial intelligence to statistics or risk measurement. Thus
extensions of such theories to conditional frameworks can be accommodated into Williams coherence, exploiting hence
the results already established for it. In many cases, these problems have been so far little investigated; for instance, much
work remains to be done in the area of measuring conditional risks. Williams coherence is not the only way of extending
Walley’s (unconditional) coherence, but it is a very general and (perhaps) immediate one; it is anyway important to weigh
pros and cons in choosing which coherence notion should be used. This evaluation affects various issues, some more familiar
(like the validity of the envelope theorem), other ones generally less familiar (like the problem of non-conglomerability).
The main purpose of this paper (extending earlier results in [16], Section 3) is to investigate more closely the role of
Williams coherence, comparing it with the nearest consistency concepts that have been developed in the literature. Since. All rights reserved.
ax: +39 040 54209.
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probability approach to uncertainty. We supply some historical information on this in Section 2.1. The hints presented there
are historically not exhaustive, being limited to key contributions and under the perspective of studyingWilliams coherence,
but they let us mention a few important properties regarding all of these concepts, which form a basis for making compar-
isons among them in the paper. Section 2.2 contains other preliminary deﬁnitions and notions.
We investigate Williams coherence with a progressively larger perspective throughout the paper. We start in Section 3.1
by discussing a nimbler variant for it, called W-coherence (already deﬁned in Section 2.2), which is adopted in the sequel. It
generalises Walley-coherence for unconditional lower previsions. In Section 3.2, we discuss potential generalisations of
other unconditional coherence concepts, focusing in particular on a little explored deﬁnition [2,10]. We supply an interesting
interpretation for it, showing that it has no straightforward extension to conditionals, but deriving some conditions that are
either necessary or sufﬁcient for W-coherence. In Section 3.3 W-coherence is compared with alternative views of conditional
coherence developed by Walley [26], proving in particular its equivalence with separate coherence (when they are compa-
rable, since separate coherence is less general). The comparison is continued in Section 3.4, discussing non-conglomerability
and the different treatment of this property in Williams’ and Walley’s approaches. Concepts related to W-coherence are dis-
cussed in Section 4. In particular, in Section 4.1 we explore a notion intermediate between W-coherence and dF-coherence,
showing its little signiﬁcance, while in Section 4.2 we discuss which condition of avoiding loss – type should be appropriate
when adopting W-coherence. It is shown that using a certain concept of avoiding uniform loss some seemingly inconsistent
features of W-coherence pointed out by Walley can be justiﬁed. In Section 4.3 we discuss centered convexity, a relevant con-
cept, (moderately) weaker than W-coherence. We point out that centered convexity shares desirable properties with W-
coherence, even though this is true at a lesser extent as far as envelope theorems are concerned. Our conclusions on the role
of W-coherence in imprecise probability theory are contained in Section 5.
2. Preliminary issues
We recall ﬁrst a few notions concerning the description of uncertainty. Following [3,8] and others, we use the logical
notation to operate with events. This originates from observing that events are described by propositions of classical logic,
and actually a formal deﬁnition of events and conditional events in these terms was given in [3,4]. We write B for both an
event B and its indicator function jBj (de Finetti’s convention), appearing from the context which of the two meanings is
intended.
A bounded random variable1 X is represented by a map X : B! R, where B is a partition of (non-impossible) events. A pos-
sible value of X, XðxÞ, corresponds to each x 2 B, which does not mean that B is unique. For instance, the partition whose gen-
eric event is ‘X ¼ x’ will do if we describe X alone, but a more reﬁned partition is needed to describe two or more random
variables simultaneously. In classical probability theory, a unique ﬁxed partition (called X there, while we reserve the symbol
X for the sure event), large enough to describe what matters, is employed. This is not necessary in general (cf. the discussion in
[26], Section 2.1.4) and will not be pursued here.
When conditioning on some non-impossible event B, the conditional random variable XjB may be represented by
XB : BjB! R, where the elements of the conditional partition BjB are obtained replacing each x 2 B with the conditional
eventxjB, and discarding thosexjBwhich turn out to be impossible, conditional on B (i.e., such that assuming B true implies
thatx is false). After this is done, XBðxjBÞ ¼ XðxÞ holds. In the special case thatB ¼ fXg, we reobtain unconditional random
variables ðXjX ¼ XÞ.
The supremum supðXjBÞ of XjB may be computed as supx)BXðxÞ (in the set-theoretic language: supx2BXðxÞ).
When working with conditional random variables, we shall sometimes employ the equality1 Alsof ðX1; . . . ;XnÞjB ¼ f ðX1jB; . . . ;XnjBÞ ð1Þ
where f is any real function, returning the random variable f ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ as a function of X1; . . . ;Xn [4]. A typical case we will
consider in the paper is f ¼ G, where G is a ‘gain’.
In the rest of the paper, the domain of the uncertainty measures considered is usually termed D. Precisely, D is an arbi-
trary (non-empty) set of bounded random variables, or more generally of bounded conditional random variables. Dmay con-
tain conditional events too, corresponding to those XjB 2 D such that X is the indicator of some event, or events when further
B ¼ X.
A lower prevision P on D is a map P : D! R. An upper prevision P may be deﬁned through the equality
PðXjBÞ ¼ PðXjBÞ 8XjB 2 D, which always lets us refer to either lower or upper previsions only. A precise prevision P cor-
responds to the special case PðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ.
2.1. A historical note
We shall deal in this paper with several notions of ‘coherence’, or weaker concepts. Their forerunner is de Finetti’s coher-
ence for (unconditional) precise previsions [8]:called gamble in [26] or bounded random quantity in [29], whilst random quantities can be unbounded in [8].
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8 r1; . . . ; rm P 0, deﬁning G ¼Pni¼1siðXi  PðXiÞÞ Pmj¼1rjðYj  PðYjÞÞ, it holds that supGP 0.
This deﬁnition includes that of dF-coherent (precise) probability as a special case, when all the random variables in D are
(indicators of) events. If further D is an algebra, dF-coherent probabilities coincide with ﬁnitely additive probabilities.
The notion of dF-coherent precise prevision is also closely related to that of expectation: whenever an expectation EðXÞ is
assessed for X, then EðXÞ is also its only dF-coherent prevision. However, whenever PðXÞ is assessed EðXÞ is not necessarily
deﬁned, because no probability on all events ‘X 6 x’ must be preliminarily elicited in order to deﬁne PðXÞ.
Although de Finetti did not develop extensively a theory of conditional previsions, nor was he much concerned with
imprecise previsions, several features in his approach were inﬂuential also in most later generalisations. We mention the
following basic facts, referring to a generic, not speciﬁed ‘consistency’ property of (precise or imprecise) previsions.
(A) Previsions are announced on an arbitrary (non-empty) set of random variables D, and consequently the deﬁnition of
their consistency is structure-free.
(B) An extension theorem ensures that a consistent prevision can be extended on any D0  D, so that the extension pre-
serves the same type of consistency on D0.
(C) Consistent previsions have a behavioural interpretation in some idealised betting scheme.
When ‘consistency’ is replaced by ‘dF-coherence’, (A), (B) and (C) are satisﬁed.2 Concerning the betting scheme, the random
variable G in Deﬁnition 1 is the gain from a bet made up of nþm elementary bets, n ‘in favour of’ X1; . . . ;Xn (the bettor is willing
to pay siPðXiÞ for receiving siXi, i ¼ 1; . . . ;n), m ‘against’ Y1; . . . ;Ym (the bettor receives rjPðYjÞ to sell rjYj, j ¼ 1; . . . ;m). The def-
inition of dF-coherence requires that, whatever is the bet, the gain cannot be negative and bounded away from 0. DF-coherent
previsions are linear and homogeneous, if the relevant quantities are in the domain D:2 The
D [ fXgPðaX þ bYÞ ¼ aPðXÞ þ bPðYÞ: ð2Þ
When adding the constraint m 6 1 in Deﬁnition 1, we obtain Walley’s deﬁnition of coherence for lower previsions:
Deﬁnition 2. P : D! R is a coherent lower prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N, 8 X0;X1; . . . ;Xn 2 D, 8 s0; s1; . . . ; sn P 0, deﬁning
G ¼Pni¼1siðXi  PðXiÞÞ  s0ðX0  PðX0ÞÞ, it holds that supGP 0.
Again, items (A), (B) and (C) above are satisﬁed by this deﬁnition. It has a well-known behavioural interpretation, dis-
cussed in [26]. Some consequences of this interpretation, not all highlighted in [26], may better stress the behavioural dif-
ference with Deﬁnition 1. Precisely, PðXÞ is an agent’s supremum buying price for X, and G is the agent’s gain resulting from
her/his buying siXi, for i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, and selling s0X0. Coherence implies, writing the last term in G as s0PðX0Þ  s0X0, that the
agent may be forced to accept at most one of her/his supremum buying prices, s0PðX0Þ, as an inﬁmum selling price for s0X0.
The restriction ‘at most one’ does not apply to Deﬁnition 1, becausem there may be any natural number. In general, we shall
say that the agent bets on (in favour or against) X with stake s.
With imprecise previsions, there is a fourth property that we will consider:
(D) Consistent imprecise previsions are characterised by some envelope theorem.
Generally speaking, envelope theorems relate a function in a certain setF to a setP of other functions with well speciﬁed
features. These theorems either ensure that by performing the (pointwise) inﬁmum or supremum on the elements of P we
get a function f 2F, or else guarantee that every f 2F may be expressed as an inﬁmum or supremum over some set P, or
both (thus characterising the functions in F). Envelope theorems may be found in many different research areas, like for
instance cooperative games [19]. They are important because:
 they ensure an often simple way of assigning a function f with the desired consistency properties;
 when being also characterisation theorems, they allow an alternative, indirect deﬁnition and interpretation of the func-
tions inF by means of sets of the (usually simpler) functions in P. Moreover, they allow proving properties of the func-
tions in F using known results about the functions in P.
Coherent lower previsions ensure property (D): a real function P is a coherent lower prevision over D if and only if
PðXÞ ¼ infP2PfPðXÞg;8X 2 D (inf is attained), where P is a set of dF-coherent precise previsions P dominating P on D, i.e.
PðXÞP PðXÞ 8X 2 D;8P 2 P [26].
Various generalisations of dF-coherence to conditional (precise or imprecise) previsions have been proposed. The adher-
ence of some of them to (A), (B) and (D) will be discussed throughout the paper. As for (C), all of them have some behavioural
interpretation. This aspect will therefore be just outlined. In particular, dF-coherence for conditional (precise) previsions was
developed in the eighties in [9,17], obeying the requirements (A), (B), (C) above.dF-coherent extension is generally not unique. In the special case that the events ‘X 6 x’ are in D 8x 2 R, while X R D, the dF-coherent extension on
is unique, and as mentioned above coincides with EðXÞ.
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XnjBn;Y1jC1; . . . ;YmjCm 2 D, 8 si P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ, 8 rj P 0 ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ, deﬁning G ¼
Pn
i¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ 
Pm
j¼1rjCj
ðYj  PðYjjCjÞÞ, B ¼
Wn
i¼1Bi _
Wm
j¼1Cj, it holds that supðGjBÞP 0.
Here the gain is GjB, a conditional random variable itself. Conditioning on B has the meaning of considering only those
values for G when at least one of B1; . . . ;Bn;C1; . . . ;Cm is true. Property (2) generalises toPðaX þ bYjBÞ ¼ aPðXjBÞ þ bPðYjBÞ: ð3Þ
Coherence concepts for conditional imprecise previsions were given by Walley [26], see Section 3.3. But the earliest pro-
posal was that of Williams [29] in 1975. His work had a limited diffusion in those years, but inﬂuenced Walley’s work and
contained in nuce several fundamental results in the theory of imprecise probabilities [25].
2.2. W-coherence and other preliminaries
In a conditional environment, we adopt the following generalisation of Deﬁnition 2 to deﬁne a coherent lower prevision
PðjÞ:
Deﬁnition 4. P : D! R is a coherent conditional lower prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N, 8X0jB0; . . . ;XnjBn 2 D, 8 s0; s1; . . . ; sn
real and non-negative, deﬁning B ¼ Wni¼0Bi and G ¼Pni¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ  s0B0ðX0  PðX0jB0ÞÞ, supðGjBÞP 0.
It is easy to realise that we would get an equivalent deﬁnition (adopted in [27]) by replacing GjB with GjS, where the sup-
port S is deﬁned as S ¼ WfBi : si–0; i ¼ 0; . . . ;ng.
Throughout the paper, Deﬁnition 4 will be referred to as Williams coherence, or W-coherence or simply coherence when
unambiguous, but as we will explain in Section 3.1, it is actually a structure-free version of the original Williams coherence.
A weaker notion than W-coherence is that of lower prevision that avoids uniform loss [27], recalled in Section 4.2. In the
unconditional environment it is termed condition of avoiding sure loss and is deﬁned in [26], Section 2.4.4a.
A further consistency notion, centered convexity [13–15], is weaker than coherence, but sufﬁciently stronger than the con-
ditions of avoiding sure or uniform loss to allow for interesting properties and applications (for instance, in risk measure-
ment [14]). Its relationship with W-coherence is discussed in Section 4.3.
Formally, the deﬁnition of convex lower prevision is obtained from Deﬁnitions 2 and 4 by introducing just the extra con-
vexity constraint
Pn
i¼1si ¼ s0 ð> 0Þ and eventually by further imposing (this is not restrictive) that s0 ¼ 1 [13,14]. Again, we
could equivalently condition G on its support S rather than on B, as done in [14,15]. Centered convexity requires in addition
that (0 2 D and) Pð0Þ ¼ 0 in the unconditional case, and further that 8XjB 2 D, 0jB 2 D and Pð0jBÞ ¼ 0 in the conditional case
(cf. Deﬁnition 10). Centering is quite a natural requirement: non-centered convex previsions have rather weak consistency
properties (see also Footnote 7), but special instances of them may be found in the risk literature (cf. [14]).
Let P be a lower prevision deﬁned on an arbitrary set D. Following (B) of Section 2.1, any consistency condition satisﬁed
by P should guarantee that there exists an extension of P satisfying the same condition on anyD0  D. If such an extension is
not unique, its vaguest or least-committal one, if existing, has a special importance. This peculiar extension is the natural
extension E in the case of coherent or, when conditioning, W-coherent previsions [25,26], the convex natural extension Ec
for centered convex (unconditional or conditional) previsions [13,14]. The natural or convex natural extensions always exist
for these consistency notions, not necessarily with other ones, like Walley-coherence in [26], Section 7.1.4b, or non-centered
convexity.
3. Coherence concepts of Williams and others
3.1. About Williams’ deﬁnition
Williams’ original deﬁnition ([29], Deﬁnition 1) differs formally from our deﬁnition of W-coherence. One reason is that it
refers to upper rather than lower previsions, but this is unimportant, since using the conjugacy relation PðXjBÞ ¼ PðXjBÞ
our condition supðGjBÞP 0 corresponds exactly to his inequality in ðAÞ of [29]. The true difference is that his notion is not
completely structure-free, as it asks in particular that, for every conditioning event B, the set XB ¼ fX : XjB 2 Dg is a linear
space. It follows for instance that Williams’ deﬁnition does not formally generalise Walley-coherence for unconditional pre-
visions (our Deﬁnition 2), which is structure-free: when B ¼ X for all XjB 2 D, the set of all X is constrained to form a linear
space XX. On the contrary, Deﬁnition 4 is in particular a generalisation of Walley’s unconditional coherence and appears to
be, in general, nimbler. The fundamental link between the two versions of Williams coherence is ensured by the following
extension theorem.
Proposition 1. If P : D! R is W-coherent on D (according to Deﬁnition 4), it has a W-coherent extension on any D0  D.
Although we are not aware of any published proof for this proposition, nevertheless it should be regarded as essentially
known. In fact, it can be proven by adapting the proofs concerning the convex natural extension in [14], thus proving that
there always exists the natural extension of a W-coherent lower prevision on any D0  D. A proof of this kind is given in the
Appendix, for the sake of completeness. Alternatively, the historically older scheme of de Finetti’s extension theorem can be
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ditional) previsions in [7], this scheme was employed in several generalisations (see e.g. [1,4,9]). In the version for W-coher-
ence, its two-step proof shows in the ﬁrst step that there exist W-coherent extensions on D0 ¼ D [ fXjBg, 8XjB, while the
second step generalises the proof to any D0 using Zorn’s lemma or equivalent results. A by-product of the ﬁrst step is that
the set of admissible W-coherent extensions on XjB is proved to be a closed interval. Its lower endpoint is the natural exten-
sion EðXjBÞ, while the upper endpoint is the upper extension UðXjBÞ of P. Thus, the scheme of de Finetti’s extension theorem
does not emphasise the role of the natural extension, but rather treats the natural and upper extension in a symmetric way.
As an important implication of Proposition 1 in our framework, when D in Deﬁnition 4 does not meet the structure
requirements in Williams’ deﬁnition it is always possible to coherently extend P on a set D0 such that these requirements
hold, and there the two notions of coherence coincide. It follows that W-coherent lower previsions have all the properties
established for Williams coherence in [29], including the important envelope theorem, stating that P is coherent on D if
and only ifPðXjBÞ ¼ inf
P2P
PðXjBÞ; 8XjB 2 Dwhere P is a set of dF-coherent precise previsions PðjÞ dominating PðjÞ on D ð8P 2 P; PðXjBÞP PðXjBÞ;8XjB 2 DÞ. Note that
inf is attained.
3.2. From unconditional to conditional coherence
As we have already pointed out, Deﬁnition 4 of W-coherence generalises Walley-coherence for unconditional previsions
(Deﬁnition 2). But other known deﬁnitions are equivalent to Deﬁnition 2. An interesting issue is therefore: why not rather
generalise them in a conditional environment? An answer is that Deﬁnition 2 seems more appropriate for further
generalisations.
The matter is relatively simple and well-known if we consider a version of coherence, equivalent to Deﬁnition 2, obtained
by restricting the stakes s0; . . . ; sn to be integers (this is Walley’s Deﬁnition 2.5.1 in [26]). The constraint on the integer stakes
can be adopted in a conditional environment too, for W-coherence as well as for some other consistency notions we discuss
in this paper, obtaining equivalent formulations. However, considering integer combinations only is not enough when the
random variables are unbounded, even in the unconditional case, as shown in [22]. We are not dealing with unbounded ran-
dom quantities here, yet in view of (potentially) pursuing the utmost generality, we prefer not to impose the integer stakes
constraint.
The situation is more complex, and deﬁnitely less explored, when turning to the following less used deﬁnition, which is
known to be equivalent to Deﬁnition 2:
Deﬁnition 5. P : D! R is a coherent lower prevision onD iff, for all n 2 N, 8 X0;X1; . . . ;Xn 2 D, 8 r1; . . . ; rn P 0, 8 l0 2 R such
that X0 P
Pn
i¼1riXi þ l0, it holds that PðX0ÞP
Pn
i¼1riPðXiÞ þ l0.
Deﬁnition 5 has a curious story: not mentioned explicitly in [26], although following directly from results established
there, it appears in [2], but without being related to coherence for imprecise previsions, which was later done in [10]. To
the best of our knowledge, Deﬁnition 5 has not been given a clear behavioural interpretation yet, nor has its potential gen-
eralisation to a conditional environment been explored. We tackle these issues in this section.
As a ﬁrst step, we rewrite the condition in Deﬁnition 5, that is,X0 P
Xn
i¼1
riXi þ l0 ) PðX0ÞP
Xn
i¼1
riPðXiÞ þ l0; ð4Þin an equivalent form. Multiply for this the inequalities in (4) by s0 > 0, let si ¼ ris0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ, k0 ¼ l0s0 and perform the
inﬁmum in the ﬁrst inequality to obtain:k0 6 inf s0X0 
Xn
i¼1
siXi
 !
) k0 6 s0PðX0Þ 
Xn
i¼1
siPðXiÞ: ð5ÞIf we deﬁne I ¼ s0X0 þ
Pn
i¼1siXi, E ¼ s0PðX0Þ þ
Pn
i¼1siPðXiÞ, (5) is rewritten as
k0 6 infðIÞ ) k0 6 E: ð6ÞLet us now come to the behavioural interpretation of Deﬁnition 5. For any given bet on X0; . . . ;Xn with stakes s0; . . . ; sn, I is
the bettor’s overall income ensuing from the bet, while E is her/his expense for betting. Note that I is random, while E is not.
From (6), Deﬁnition 5 asks as a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for coherence that infðIÞ 6 E, i.e. that supðIÞP E, for any
bet. This is a reasonable requirement: it does not hold iff sup I < E for some bet, and this means that a speciﬁc bet can be
arranged whose ensuing gain G ¼ I  E is strictly negative and bounded away from zero whatever happens, and the bettor
suffers from a sure loss. It is clear then that Deﬁnitions 2 and 5 are equivalent: they both require that no bet must be such
that supG < 0.
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this the gain G in Deﬁnition 4 highlighting the expense and income terms. We have I ¼ s0B0X0 þ
Pn
i¼1siBiXi,
E ¼ s0B0PðX0jB0Þ þ
Pn
i¼1siBiPðXijBiÞ and the condition supðGjBÞP 0 in Deﬁnition 4 is written as
supðI  EjBÞP 0: ð7ÞThe following Proposition is fundamental for discussing the potential generalisations of Deﬁnition 5.
Proposition 2. Consider, as in Deﬁnition 4, a bet on X0jB0; . . . ;XnjBn with stakes s0; . . . ; sn, respectively, and deﬁne B ¼
Wn
i¼0Bi. Let
k0 be any real number.
(a) The following condition implies condition (7):k0 6 infðIjBÞ ) k0 6 infðEjBÞ: ð8Þ
(b) Condition (7) implies thatk0 6 infðIjBÞ ) k0 6 supðEjBÞ ð9ÞProof
(a) Let (8) hold, and take k0 ¼ infðIjBÞ. Then infðEjBÞP infðIjBÞ ¼  supðIjBÞ, that is infðEjBÞ þ supðIjBÞP 0. We
obtain from this 0 6 supðinfðEjBÞ þ IjBÞ 6 supðI  EjBÞ, which is (7).
(b) Let (7) hold. We obtain, assuming that k0 6 infðIjBÞ at the third inequality, 0 6 supðI  EjBÞ 6 supðIjBÞþ
supðEjBÞ ¼ supðEjBÞ  infðIjBÞ 6 supðEjBÞ  k0. Hence k0 6 supðEjBÞ, so that (9) holds. h
When B0 ¼ . . . ¼ Bn ¼ X, i.e. when we consider a bet on unconditional random variables only, both (8) and (9) reduce to
(6). As a by-product, we reobtain the known result that Deﬁnitions 2 and 5 are equivalent.
A comparison of conditions (5), (8) and (9) reveals that the expense E is random in a conditional environment: it depends on
the outcomes of B0; . . . ;Bn which (apart from those Bi ¼ X, if any) are unknown to the bettor at the betting time. This fact
appears to be the real difﬁculty in trying to extend Deﬁnition 5 to a conditional form: we actually get two versions, (8)
and (9), with weaker properties. Condition (9) is potentially useful to disprove W-coherence: if it does not hold for some
bet, the given PðjÞ is not W-coherent. Condition (8) is sufﬁcient for W-coherence, when holding for any bet. A condition
slightly simpler than (8) may be used for the same purpose under an additional constraint, as follows
Proposition 3. Consider a bet in Deﬁnition 4 such that ^ni¼0Bi–;. The following condition implies condition (7):s0PðX0jB0Þ 
Xn
i¼1
siPðXijBiÞP supðIjBÞ: ð10ÞProof. We equivalently prove that if (7) does not hold, then p ¼ s0PðX0jB0Þ 
Pn
i¼1siPðXijBiÞ < supðIjBÞ. Noting for this that
^ni¼0Bi–; ensures that p is a possible value for EjB and hence p 2 ½infðEjBÞ; supðEjBÞ, we get 0 > supðI  EjBÞ ¼
supðE ðIÞjBÞP supðEjBÞ  supðIjBÞP p  supðIjBÞ, from which p < supðIjBÞ follows. h
To ensure W-coherence using (10), it is necessary that ^ni¼0Bi–;, for any bet. A relevant special case which obeys this con-
straint is that of the conditioning events in D forming a monotone (or nested) family, i.e. they can be totally ordered by
implication (or inclusion, in the set-theoretic approach).
Summing up, it does not seem possible to generalise Deﬁnition 5 while conditioning. This should be ascribed to the nature
of the term representing the ‘expense’ in the gain decomposition, which is generally random outside the unconditional
framework.
3.3. Alternative concepts of coherence
A further issue is that a number of different generalisations of coherence (Deﬁnition 2 or equivalent) to a conditional
framework have been proposed in [26]: how do they relate to W-coherence? We discuss some basic facts about this rela-
tionship in this section and the next one. A further discussion of Walley’s criticism on Williams coherence needs some pre-
liminaries on the concept of avoiding uniform loss, and is therefore presented in Section 4.2.
The coherence concepts deﬁned in Walley’s book [26] include: separate coherence, which is the ﬁrst coherence notion in a
conditional framework, presented in Section 6.2.2, coherence with unconditional previsions (Section 6.3.2), which is general-
ised to coherence in Section 7.1.4b, andweak coherence, deﬁned in Section 7.1.4a. Coherence as deﬁned in Section 7.1.4b is the
prevailing concept in [26], and will be referred to as Walley-coherence here.
None of these concepts is structure-free: a common feature is that the conditioning events must belong to some partition
and every (non-impossible) event B in the partition is a conditioning event for some XjB 2 D. Precisely, just one partition is
employed in the case of separate coherence (cf. Deﬁnition 6), a ﬁnite number of partitions are used withWalley-coherence or
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variables) in the case of coherence with unconditional previsions. The reason for this kind of constraint lies in Walley’s
requirement for conglomerability, a concept discussed in the next section which is itself not structure-free. There are also
other constraints, see e.g. Section 6.3.1, which are less fundamental, in the sense that several of them are made to simplify
the theory but could be removed; [11] is a paper in this direction.
It ensues that the discussion of, say, Walley-coherence of assignments on relatively simple domains, like
D ¼ fX1jB1;X2jB2;X3jðB1 ^ ðB2 _ B3ÞÞg, cannot be performed unless these domains are embedded in larger ones, satisfying
the constraints in [26] (this operation could be not simple, it may require some extension theorem which is not always avail-
able for Walley-coherence).
Because of these features, Walley’s notions of coherence are not always comparable with W-coherence: there are do-
mains where these notions are not deﬁned, while W-coherence always is. When making comparisons, we must consider
W-coherence only on those domains D which obey the constraints of the coherence notion it is compared with. When this
is done, W-coherence is equivalent to:
(a) separate coherence (this is proven in Proposition 5 below);
(b) Walley-coherence, with the extra assumption that all partitions Bi of conditioning events in that deﬁnition are ﬁnite
(this equivalence is stated without proof in [26]); without this assumption, W-coherence is more general thanWalley-
coherence.
As for coherence with unconditional previsions, it is a special case of Walley-coherence. Concerning weak coherence, it is
implied byWalley-coherence but its importance seems essentially instrumental in the theory in [26]. Useful results for inter-
preting the conceptual difference between weak coherence and Walley-coherence were recently given in [12].
Separate coherence has an important role in [26], as it is a prerequisite for the other kinds of coherence. We are going to
prove now its equivalence with W-coherence. We ﬁrst state a preliminary result, which is of some interest in itself, as it sim-
pliﬁes checking W-coherence of P : D! R if the conditioning events of all XjB 2 D have a special separation structure.
Proposition 4. Given P : D! R, let C be a partition and suppose that, for any XjB 2 D, B implies some event in C. Deﬁne 8C 2 C,
DC ¼ fXjB 2 D : B ) Cg. If P is W-coherent on each DC , then it is W-coherent on D.
Proof. The assumptions imply that D ¼ SC2CDC , and that a generic gain G in Deﬁnition 4 may be written as follows, empha-
sising that distinct random variables may have the same conditioning event: G ¼Pni¼1Pnij¼1sijBiðXij  PðXijjBiÞÞ
s0B0ðX0  PðX0jB0ÞÞ.
Now take, say, B1 and suppose B1 ) C1 2 C. Then obviously supðGjBÞP supðGj
W
Bi)C1BiÞ, where
W
Bi)C1Bi (–;, at least
B1 ) C1) sums those Bi among B0;B1; . . . ;Bn that imply C1. But Gj
W
Bi)C1Bi is the conditional gain of a bet on (some) elements
of DC1 only, because those (and only those) XijjBi (or possibly X0jB0) which are not in DC1 are ﬁltered out, when conditioning
on
W
Bi)C1Bi, by their indicators Bi (or B0) which all take value zero. (For instance, if
W
Bi)C1Bi ¼ B1 _ B3,
GjB1 _ B3 ¼
Pn1
j¼1s1jB1ðX1j  PðX1jÞÞ þ
Pn3
j¼1s3jB3ðX3j  PðX3jÞÞjB1 _ B3Þ. It follows from W-coherence of P on DC1 that
supðGjWBi)C1BiÞP 0, hence also supðGjBÞP 0. h
Remark. Wemay replace ‘W-coherent’ with ‘dF-coherent’ in Proposition 4, getting another true proposition. This is because
the preceding proof relies essentially on the structure of D.
In the sequel we shall apply Proposition 4 in the special case that the events B themselves form partition C. Let now B be
an arbitrary (ﬁnite or not) partition of non-impossible events.
Deﬁnition 6. The conditional lower previsions PBðXjBÞ, deﬁned for any B 2 B and X 2HðBÞ, whereHðBÞ is an arbitrary set of
random variables containing B, are separately coherent iff, for every B 2 B,
(i) PBðBjBÞ ¼ 1
(ii) 8s0; . . . ; sn P 0, 8X0; . . . ;Xn 2HðBÞ, deﬁning G ¼Pni¼1siðXi  PBðXijBÞÞ  s0ðX0  PBðX0jBÞÞ, it holds that supGP 0.3
Deﬁne now the conditional lower prevision P such that PðXjBÞ ¼ PBðXjBÞ, 8B 2 B, 8X 2HðBÞ (P is the collection of all PB).
Proposition 5. The lower previsions PB ðB 2 BÞ in Deﬁnition 6 are separately coherent iff P is W-coherent on D ¼ [B2BDB, where
DB ¼ fXjB : X 2HðBÞg.
Proof. We prove ﬁrst that W-coherence implies separate coherence. If P is W-coherent, (i) trivially holds. With regard to (ii),
it follows from supG ¼maxfsupBG; supBcGgP supBG ¼ supðGjBÞ ¼ supðBGjBÞP 0, the last equality holding by (1), the
inequality by W-coherence.3 This is the deﬁnition in [26], after replacing integer stakes with real non-negative ones.
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then supðsðB PðBjBÞÞ þPni¼1siðXi  PðXijBÞÞ  s0ðX0  PðX0jBÞÞÞ ¼ supðsðB 1Þ þ GÞ ¼ maxðsupBðsðB 1Þ þ GÞ; supBc ðsðB 1Þ
þGÞÞP 0.
If we choose s > maxðsupBcG;0Þ, the last inequality implies supBðsðB 1Þ þ GÞP 0, since then supBc ðsðB 1Þ þ GÞ ¼ s
þsupBcG < 0. Using also (1), supBðsðB 1Þ þ GÞ ¼ supðGjBÞ ¼ supðBGjBÞ ¼ supð
Pn
i¼1siBðXi  PðXijBÞÞ  s0BðX0  PðX0jBÞÞjBÞ
P 0, which means, given the arbitrariness of n, X0; . . . ;Xn and s0; . . . ; sn P 0, that P is W-coherent on DB. Then W-coherence
of P on eachDB implies W-coherence of P onD, because of Proposition 4 (where C,DC are nowB,DB respectively). h
W-coherence and Walley-coherence are equivalent ((cf. b) above) when the partitions Bi of conditioning events in Wal-
ley-coherence are all ﬁnite. In general, properties of W-coherence involving only ﬁnitely many distinct conditioning events
hold for Walley-coherence too (aW-coherent assessment or possibly one of its W-coherent extensions, cf. Proposition 1, may
be referred in this case to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite partitions Bi). For instance, several product or sign rules are discussed in [16]
using W-coherence, but they hold with Walley-coherence too. One such rule is that, if P is W-coherent on
D  fAXjB;AjB;XjA ^ Bg and PðXjA ^ BÞ > 0, then PðAXjBÞP PðAjBÞ  PðXjA ^ BÞ.
In general, W-coherence has the advantage over Walley-coherence that it veriﬁes properties (A), (B), (D) in Section 2.1,
while none of them necessarily holds with Walley-coherence. Property (D) allows also a sensitivity analysis interpretation
of W-coherence. W-coherence is not necessarily conglomerative, while Walley-coherence is. This is a basic difference, and
we comment on it in the next Section 3.4.
Last but not least, we note that the notion of conditional random variable (and of conditional event) is often left at an
informal level in the literature, including [26,29]. A formal approach to these and other descriptive tools of uncertainty, only
sketched in Section 2, is developed in [3,4].
Although the way conditional random variables or events are interpreted is seemingly not particularly relevant in many
matters, a greater formalisation turns out to be useful with other ones. For an example, consider Lemma 6.2.4 in [26]: this
lemma states that, if BX ¼ BY and the separate coherence conditions (i), (ii) of Deﬁnition 6 hold for a lower prevision PðjBÞ,
then PðXjBÞ ¼ PðYjBÞ. The result depends on the interpretation of conditional lower previsions in [26], which does not for-
mally deﬁne conditional random variables. But using the approach outlined in Section 2 and in particular (1) with n ¼ 2,
X1 ¼ B, X2 ¼ X, f ðB;XÞ ¼ BX, and since BjB (the indicator of event B given that B is true) takes value 1, we get
BXjB ¼ ðBjBÞ  ðXjBÞ ¼ XjB, thus condition BX ¼ BY alone implies XjB ¼ YjB. Consequently we achieve the more general result
that lðXjBÞ ¼ lðY jBÞ whatever the uncertainty measure l is, not because of coherence (l could even be incoherent), but
merely because we are evaluating the same thing.
3.4. The issue of non-conglomerability
Suppose that an uncertainty measure l is given on a domain D which includes a random variable X and the conditional
random variables XjB, for all B in a given partition B. Then l is conglomerable (with respect to X and B) iffinf
B2B
lðXjBÞ 6 lðXÞ 6 sup
B2B
lðXjBÞ ð11Þ
while l is non-conglomerable if (11) does not hold. In words, (11) requires lðXÞ to belong to the smallest interval containing
all conditional evaluations lðXjBÞ.
When X is (the indicator of) an event and l is a precise probability P, conglomerability may seem an obvious property at
ﬁrst sight, and in fact it holds trivially if the partition B is ﬁnite. When B is inﬁnite, the matter is however much more com-
plicated [18].
It was de Finetti who discovered in his 1930 paper [6] that dF-coherent probabilities may be non-conglomerable, present-
ing two nice examples supporting this seemingly counterintuitive fact. His examples were forerunning the theory, as Deﬁ-
nition 2 was not known at those times. We reconsider now one of such examples, showing that the probability it uses is
actually dF-coherent.
Example. A number is chosen at random from the set Nþ of positive integers. Deﬁne xn ¼ ‘n is chosen’, and term B0 the
partition of all xn, n 2 Nþ.
If A is the event that an odd number is chosen, clearly PðAÞ ¼ 12. Deﬁning Bn ¼ x2n1 _x4n2 _x4n, 8n 2 Nþ,
B1;2 ¼ fB1; . . . ;Bn; . . .g is a partition coarser than B0, and PðAjBnÞ ¼ 13, 8n (any Bn says that either one odd number or two
even ones are selected, so B1 ¼ ‘1;2 or 4 is chosen’, etc.). It ensues that (11) does not hold, and P is non-conglomerable.
The example is easily generalised, as noted in [6], replacing B1;2 with the partition Bh;k such that each of its events
B01; . . . ; B
0
n; . . . implies that one out of hþ k numbers is chosen, h numbers being odd, k even. Then PðAjB0nÞ ¼ hhþk– 12 ¼ PðAÞ, if
h–k: P is non-conglomerable.
To prove that P is dF-coherent on D ¼ fA;AjB01; . . . ;AjB0n; . . .g, note that all possible gains in Deﬁnition 1 are of two disjoint
types, according to whether they include (a bet on) A or not. For those who do not supðGjWrj¼1B0ij ÞP 0, applying the remark
following Proposition 4 (here DC ¼ fAjB0ng, P is dF-coherent on DC since hhþk 2 ½0;1Þ. A generic G including A may be written,
in a way shorter but equivalent to that of Deﬁnition 1, as G ¼ s A 12
 þPrj¼1sjB0ij A hhþk
 
, where s; s1; . . . ; sr may take any
real value. Among those eventsxn of partition B0 such thatxn ^ ðB0i1 _ . . . _ B0ir Þ ¼ ;, there are some implying A, while others
imply Ac . If xn ) A, GðxnÞ ¼ 12 s, when xn ) Ac , GðxnÞ ¼  12 s. In all cases, maxGP 0.
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glomerable. We believe that in principle non-conglomerability should not be ruled out a priori.
The issue of non-conglomerability is a root difference between Williams’ and Walley’s approaches to conditional coher-
ence. Williams, following de Finetti, does not require conglomerability. Thus, for instance, the probability P in the example is
a special case of W-coherent prevision.
Walley asks for conglomerability in the consistency concepts, other than separate coherence, he develops in a conditional
framework. These concepts should comply with a conglomerative principle ([26], Section 6.3.3); technically, his consistency
notions implement this principle by including terms like GðXjBÞ ¼PB2BBðX  PðXjBÞÞ in the expressions of the gains.4 These
terms are well-deﬁned also when B is inﬁnite, because the factors B are the indicators of events in a partition B. Thus only one
of them is non-null, whatever happens, and hence the summation is always made up of a single term. Conglomerability implies
then various conditions, similar to (11) ([26], Section 6.5). In the case of Walley-coherent precise previsions, it implies axiom
(C14) in [26], Section 6.5.7, i.e.4 WePðXÞP inf
B2B
PðXjBÞ: ð12ÞActually, it is proven in [26] that (12) is equivalent to Walley-coherence for precise previsions, under certain structure
constraints on D. These constraints imply in particular that ðX;XjB 2 DÞ ) ðX;XjB 2 DÞ, a condition ensuring alone that
(12) is equivalent to (11), since PðXÞP infB2BPðXjBÞ iff PðXÞ 6 supB2BðXjBÞ.
In particular, it ensues from this argument that the probability P in the example (technically, any of its dF-coherent exten-
sions on a set D0 meeting the structure requirements of Walley-coherence) is not Walley-coherent.
More generally, non-conglomerable dF-coherent conditional previsions are not Walley-coherent (they do not satisfy con-
glomerative conditions like (12)). Note that the term ‘linear prevision’ in [26] identiﬁes dF-coherent previsions in the uncon-
ditional environment (the ﬁrst ﬁve chapters), but corresponds to those dF-coherent conditional previsions which are
conglomerable in a conditional setting (see Section 6.5.7 in [26]).
The issue of conglomerability allows a more in-depth explanation of the differences between W-coherence and Walley-
coherence. We pinpoint the following items:
(a) If we wish that an uncertainty measure l is conglomerable, some constraints must be imposed on its domain D, as
appears already from (11): if XjB 2 D, then it must hold that XjB0 2 D 8B0 in some partition including B. In particular,
this or analogous constraints seem unavoidable in Walley-coherence, which is necessarily not structure-free.
(b) Walley’s approach may be interpreted as a thorough investigation of conglomerable imprecise previsions. It can be
adopted, if one feels that imposing conglomerability does not rule out some signiﬁcant models in the speciﬁc uncer-
tain situation being investigated.
(c) Conglomerable imprecise previsions have some additional properties, ensuing from inequalities like (11), (12), which
are helpful in several derivations and problems. The disadvantage is that they do not always ensure that the envelope
theorem holds, or that there exists a conglomerable natural extension.
4. Beyond Williams coherence
We explore in this section howW-coherence relates to other consistency concepts, either stronger (Section 4.1) or weaker
(Sections 4.2, 4.3).
4.1. Between Williams’ and de Finetti’s coherence?
As well-known, coherence for lower previsions (Deﬁnition 2) may be obtained formally from dF-coherence (Deﬁnition 1)
by restricting the number of bets ‘against’ some X 2 D (unconstrained with dF-coherence) tom 6 1. The same constraint dis-
tinguishes, in a conditional framework, W-coherence (Deﬁnition 4) from dF-coherence (Deﬁnition 3): with W-coherence we
can bet against (at most) one X0jB0 2 D.
A natural question is then: what if we relax this constraint, for instance asking - to keep the relaxation at its minimum -
that we can bet ‘against’ at most two XjB 2 D? Shall we obtain a signiﬁcant concept of coherence, intermediate between W-
coherence and dF-coherence? The answer is essentially negative, even in an unconditional environment. For simplicity, we
illustrate this case only.
Deﬁnition 7. P : D! R is a bi-coherent lower prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N, 8 X1; . . . ;Xn;Y1;Y2 2 D, 8 s1; . . . ; sn; r1; r2 real
and non-negative, deﬁning G ¼Pni¼1siðXi  PðXiÞÞ  r1ðY1  PðY1ÞÞ  r2ðY2  PðY2ÞÞ, supGP 0.
Clearly, any bi-coherent lower prevision satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2 as well and is therefore coherent. It also avoids sure loss
([26], Section 2.4.4 (a)), like (as well known) any coherent lower prevision. Furthershall meet one such term in Section 4.2.1, Eq. (13).
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(a) If X;Y ;X þ Y 2 D, then PðX þ YÞ ¼ PðXÞ þ PðYÞ.
(b) If X;aX 2 D ða 2 RÞ, then PðaXÞ ¼ aPðXÞ.
Proof. To prove (a), ﬁrst observe that the coherence of P implies PðX þ YÞP PðXÞ þ PðYÞ ([26], Section 2.6.1e). For the
reverse inequality, put n ¼ 1, X1 ¼ X þ Y , Y1 ¼ X, Y2 ¼ Y , s1 ¼ r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 1 in Deﬁnition 7.
When aP 0, (b) follows from the coherence of P ([26], Section 2.6.1 (f)). Let us suppose a < 0. Putting n ¼ 2, X1 ¼ X,
X2 ¼ aX, s1 ¼ a, s2 ¼ 1, r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 0 in the gain in Deﬁnition 7, we get PðaXÞ 6 aPðXÞ. The opposite inequality follows putting
n ¼ 0, Y1 ¼ X, Y2 ¼ aX, r1 ¼ a, r2 ¼ 1. h
Proposition 6 emphasises that any bi-coherent lower prevision is linear and homogenous on a large enough domain, i.e. it
behaves essentially like a dF-coherent prevision (cf. (2)). Actually, any bi-coherent lower prevision is dF-coherent, when the
domain on which it is deﬁned is sufﬁciently rich, as the following corollary of Proposition 6 points out.
Corollary 1. Let P : D! R be bi-coherent. If either X 2 D 8X 2 D or X þ Y 2 D 8X;Y 2 D, then P is dF-coherent.
Proof. LetX 2 D 8X 2 D. Since P avoids sure loss, and PðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ8X 2 D by Proposition 6b, dF-coherence of P follows
at once from Theorem 2.8.2 in [26]. Let now X þ Y 2 D 8X;Y 2 D. Since P is coherent, PðXÞP PðYÞ þ l, 8X;Y 2 D such that
X P Y þ l ([26], Section 2.6.1d). Besides, property (a) in Proposition 6 holds. This implies dF-coherence of P by Theorem 2.8.3
in [26]. h
Nevertheless, a bi-coherent P is not necessarily dF-coherent, when the domain of P does not satisfy the closure properties
of Corollary 1, as illustrated by the following simple example.
Example. Let B ¼ fx1;x2;x3g be a partition and P the vacuous coherent lower prevision on B: PðxiÞ ¼ 0 ði ¼ 1;2;3Þ.
Actually, P is bi-coherent as well. To show this, we prove that the supremum of any gain in Deﬁnition 7 is non-negative. It is
sufﬁcient to inspect only the gains of the form Gi ¼ siðxi  PðxiÞÞ  sjðxj  PðxjÞÞ  skðxk  PðxkÞÞ ¼ sixi  sjxj  skxk
ði–j–k–i; i; j; k 2 f1;2;3g; si; sj; sk P 0Þ, since the non-negativity of the supremum of any other kind of gain in Deﬁnition 7 is
implied by the coherence of P. Clearly, GiðxiÞ ¼ si P 0 ði ¼ 1;2;3Þ, hence P is bi-coherent, although, patently, P is not dF-
coherent.
We note incidentally that the vacuous lower prevision is not always bi-coherent, not even on partitions: if the partition in
the example were B0 ¼ fx1;x2g, then supG < 0 in Deﬁnition 7 when G ¼ x1 x2 ¼ 1 (i.e. when n ¼ 0, Yi ¼ xi, ri ¼ 1,
i ¼ 1;2). This also shows that coherence and bi-coherence are not equivalent, when bi-coherence may differ from dF-
coherence.
Those bi-coherent previsions which are not dF-coherent on D do not satisfy property (B) in Section 2.1, i.e. they do not
ensure bi-coherent extensions on any superset D0  D. This is shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let P : D! R be bi-coherent and letL be any linear space that contains D. Then P can be bi-coherently extended on
L if and only if P is dF-coherent on D.
Proof. The ‘if’ part follows from the extension theorem for dF-coherent previsions, the ‘only if’ part from Corollary 1 (imply-
ing that any bi-coherent extension of P on L is dF-coherent on L, hence also on D L). h
Thus, for instance, the lower prevision presented in the previous example cannot be bi-coherently extended to the set of
random variables deﬁned on the partitionB. Corollary 2 could be further generalised: there are instances of bi-coherent, but
not dF-coherent, lower previsions that cannot be bi-coherently extended on supersets which are not even linear spaces. The
important message to convey is anyway already clear: bi-coherence is not particularly signiﬁcant, because either it coincides
with dF-coherence or, when it can differ from dF-coherence, property (B) of Section 2.1 may not hold, not even in rather com-
mon situations.
4.2. The condition of avoiding uniform loss
In the unconditional case, the most studied consistency condition weaker than coherence (Deﬁnition 2) is that of avoiding
sure loss, obtained formally from Deﬁnition 2 putting s0 ¼ 0. With W-coherence, the corresponding weaker notion is the
following
Deﬁnition 8. P : D! R avoids uniform loss (AUL) iff, for all n 2 Nþ, 8 X1jB1; . . . ;XnjBn 2 D, 8 s1; . . . ; sn real and non-negative,
deﬁning B ¼ _ni¼1Bi and G ¼
Pn
i¼1siBiðXi  PðXiÞÞ, it holds that supðGjBÞP 0.
The notion of avoiding uniform loss was used in [27], where other equivalent characterisations are supplied. When
P ¼ P ¼ P, P avoids uniform loss if and only if P is dF-coherent. Clearly, W-coherence of P implies that P avoids uniform loss.
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factory notion is that of centered convexity (cf. Section 4.3).
In this section we explore the relationship between the AUL condition and a similar notion introduced in [26], and recon-
sider an example on W-coherence discussed in [26] in the light of this.
4.2.1. Walley’s condition of avoiding sure loss
Given a partition B and two arbitrary setsH,K of unconditional random variables, such that 0 2H, B 2H 8B 2 B, sup-
pose throughout this section that D has the following special structure: D ¼K [SB2BDB, where DB ¼ fY jB : Y 2Hg.
Deﬁnition 9. Let P : D! R be such that
(a) the restriction of P onK is a(n unconditional) coherent lower prevision;
(b) the restrictions of P on each DB, B 2 B, are separately coherent.
Then P avoids sure loss on D iff, for all m;n 2 N, 8 X1; . . . ;Xm 2K, 8 Y1; . . . ;Yn 2H,8 sj P 0 ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ,
8 ti P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ,5 Con
B; B 2 B
ensures
6 Notsup
Xm
j¼1
sjðXj  PðXjÞÞ þ
Xn
i¼1
ti
X
B2 B
BðYi  PðYijBÞÞ
 !
P 0: ð13ÞDeﬁnition 9 is Walley’s Deﬁnition 6.3.2 of avoiding sure loss in [26]; here the following assumptions5 are introduced, without
altering Deﬁnition 6.3.2:
(i) the non-negative coefﬁcients sj, ti are real, but not necessarily integers;
(ii) we do not requireH,K to be linear spaces, unlike condition (a) in [26], Section 6.3.1, and modiﬁed correspondingly
Deﬁnition 6.3.2, as indicated at the end of Section 6.3.1.
An interesting remark is that Deﬁnition 9 is formally no extension of the condition of avoiding sure loss for unconditional pre-
visions (Deﬁnition 2.4.4a in [26]): ifK ¼£ and B ¼ fXg, it reduces to the notion of coherence (Deﬁnition 2). This depends
on assuming (b) in Deﬁnition 9. The same remark applies to the concepts of avoiding sure, partial or uniform loss6 deﬁned in
[26], Chapter 7, since separate coherence is a prerequisite for them too.
Proposition 7. If P avoids sure loss on D, it avoids uniform loss on D.
Proof. Given the special structure of D, all gains G in Deﬁnition 8 may be written as follows,G ¼
Xm
j¼1
sjðXj  PðXjÞÞ þ
Xq
i¼1
Xki
r¼1
tirBiðYir  PðYir jBiÞÞ; ð14Þwith m; qP 0. Suppose P avoids sure loss, and consider the following (exhaustive) cases.
(i) The second summation in (14) is zero ðq ¼ 0Þ. Then supGP 0 follows from Deﬁnition 9, (a).
(ii) The ﬁrst summation in (14) is zero ðm ¼ 0Þ. Separate coherence of P on all DB (Deﬁnition 9, b) implies W-coherence of
P on
S
B2BDB (Proposition 5), which implies that P avoids uniform loss on
S
B2BDB, hence supGj_qi¼1Bi P 0.
(iii) m  q > 0. This implies supðGjBÞ ¼ supðGjXÞ ¼ supG in Deﬁnition 8. We can write G as a gain of the kind (13), since
BiðYir  PðYirjBiÞÞ ¼
P
B2BBðBiYir  PðBiYirjBÞÞ (we used the fact that BBi ¼ 0 if B–Bi, and that BiYirjB ¼ BijB  YirjB; conse-
quently, if B–Bi, BiYirjB ¼ 0jB, and PðBiYirjBÞ ¼ 0Þ. Then G in (14) is a gain of type (13) from a bet on X1; . . . ;Xm, and on
the conditional random variables B1Y11jB; . . . ; BqYqkq jB, 8 B 2 B. Hence supGP 0.
In all cases, G satisﬁes the conditions in Deﬁnition 8. h
Hence, Deﬁnition 9 is stronger than Deﬁnition 8, when they are comparable. The key difference is that Deﬁnition 9 can be
justiﬁed following a conglomerative principle (cf. [26], Section 6.3.3) while Deﬁnition 8 does not rely on it. This fact is rel-
evant in explaining some of Walley’s remarks on Williams coherence, as we shall now see.dition (b) of Section 6.3.1 in [26], i.e. Y 2H) BY 2H; 8B 2 B, may be replaced by our assumptions on D, in particular by 0 2H. In fact, given any
, we have that BY jB is equal to Y jB, by (1), when B ¼ B, while, when B–B, BY jB ¼ 0jB ð2 DÞ. Therefore, PðBY jBÞ is deﬁned 8B;B 2 B, which is what
condition (b) of Section 6.3.1 in [26]. We did not mention condition (c) of Section 6.3.1 because it is unnecessary in the following derivations.
e that the meaning of the term avoiding uniform loss in [26] is different from that used in this paper, following Deﬁnition 8.
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A critical remark in [26] about Williams coherence is that it does not always satisfy Walley’s condition of avoiding sure
loss.
The important fact here is that if an agent adopts W-coherence, her/his reference minimal consistency concept should be
Deﬁnition 8 of avoiding uniform loss, or equivalent. Referring to Deﬁnition 9 of avoiding sure loss would determine a kind of
inconsistency: the agent requires (with the condition of avoiding sure loss) and does not require (with W-coherence) con-
glomerability at the same time.
Keeping the concept of avoiding uniform loss as a reference, the criticism to W-coherence outlined in some examples in
[26] does not apply. We discuss here one such example ([26], Section 6.6.6).
LetB be a denumerable partition whose elements are indexed in the set Z f0g of non-zero integers and callxz the gen-
eric element in B. Deﬁne two dF-coherent precise probabilities Pþ and P on B, as follows. PþðxzÞ ¼ 2z if z > 0, PþðxzÞ ¼ 0,
8 z < 0, while PðxzÞ ¼ 0, 8z. Extend Pþ, P on B ¼ Wfz<0gxz: clearly PþðBÞ ¼ 0 (Pþ is r-additive), while the extension of P is
not unique, and we may dF-coherently choose PðBÞ ¼ 1. The extensions on A ¼ Bc ¼ Wfz>0gxz are then PðAÞ ¼ 0, PþðAÞ ¼ 1.
Deﬁne now P ¼ PþþP2 . Since mixtures of dF-coherent probabilities are dF-coherent, P is dF-coherent. Let n 2 Nþ, and deﬁne
Bn ¼ xn _xn. Because PðBnÞ ¼ PðxnÞ > 0, the extension of P on xnjBn is uniquely determined by Bayes’ rule, and
PðxnjBnÞ ¼ 1. Similarly, PðAjBnÞ ¼ 1, while PðAÞ ¼ 12. Then P is a dF-coherent conditional probability on
D ¼ B [ fB;A;Bn;xnjBn;AjBng: this follows from the fact that dF-coherent (conditional or not) probabilities can be dF-coher-
ently extended on any event [4,8,9], and that the extension of P onxnjBn and AjBn is unique. DF-coherence of P onD is equiv-
alent to its avoiding uniform loss on D, when viewing P as a special imprecise prevision [27]. Thus P does not incur uniform
loss, but it is shown in [26] that it incurs sure loss (in the sense of Deﬁnition 9). This is because P is non-conglomerable, and
in fact it does not obey the conglomerability axiom (12).
Similar conclusions hold for other examples in [26]: inconsistencies arise only when conglomerability axioms are used in
a hybrid way. Thus the very question in choosing between W-coherence and Walley-coherence (when they do not coincide)
seems to be a problem of imposing or not conglomerability.
4.3. Centered convexity
While modiﬁcations of the deﬁnition of W-coherence towards some notions intermediate between it and dF-coherence
seem to yield no really signiﬁcant results, the notion of centered convexity is intermediate between that of avoiding uniform
loss and W-coherence and has interesting properties.
Deﬁnition 10. P : D! R is a convex conditional lower prevision on D iff 8n 2 Nþ, 8X0jB0; . . . ;XnjBn 2 D,
8s1; . . . ; sn P 0 :
Pn
i¼1si ¼ 1, deﬁning G ¼
Pn
i¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ  B0ðX0  PðX0jB0ÞÞ, supfGj_ni¼0BigP 0. Further, P is centered
if besides 0jB 2 D and Pð0jBÞ ¼ 0;8XjB 2 D.
The theory of centered convex previsions was developed in [13–15], generalising under many respects the theory of W-
coherence. These previsions satisfy the properties (A), (B) and (C) from Section 2.1, and operationally correspond to the
important notion of convex risk measure.
Property (D) in Section 2.1 is the only one, among those stressed in this paper, where W-coherence still has a deﬁnite
advantage over centered convexity, at the current state of art. In the rest of this section, we give some explanation of this
fact. The material is derived from [15], where the interested reader may ﬁnd more details. We present here the simplest
envelope theorem, whose proof requires preliminarily the following
Proposition 8. LetP be a set of convex conditional lower previsions deﬁned onD. If PðXjBÞ ¼ infQ2PfQðXjBÞg is ﬁnite 8XjB 2 D, P
is convex on D.
Proposition 8 generalises to convex conditional lower previsions a statement already established for coherent [26] or con-
vex unconditional [13] lower previsions.7 The proof is similar to those in [13,26] and is omitted.
4.3.1. Notation
Given D, let E ¼ fB : 9XjB 2 Dg.
Theorem 1 (Envelope Theorem). Let P be a set of dF-coherent precise previsions on D [ E such that 8P 2 P, PðBÞ > 0 8B 2 E,
and let a : P! R be a real function. Then7 The
must be
rather wPðXjBÞ ¼ inf
P2P
PðXjBÞ þ aðPÞ
PðBÞ
 
8XjB 2 D ð15Þis a convex conditional lower prevision on D, whenever the inﬁmum in (15) is ﬁnite. Further, P is centered iff
infP2P
aðPÞ
PðBÞ
n o
¼ 0; 8B 2 E.re is a conceptual difference with coherence: since convexity does not imply QðXjBÞP infðXjBÞ (internality), the ﬁniteness condition of the inﬁmum
required in Proposition 8. Internality holds when the convex previsions are centered. This fact exempliﬁes that convexity without centering may be a
eak consistency requirement.
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Proposition 8.
To prove that Pa is a convex conditional lower prevision, we show that a generic G in Deﬁnition 10 may be referred to P,
after substituting PaðXjBÞ with PðXjBÞ þ aPðBÞ, and hence its supremum is non-negative because P is dF-coherent. In fact, let
X0jB0; . . . ;XnjBn 2 D, s1; . . . ; sn P 0 such that
Pn
i¼1si ¼ 1. Then G can be written as G ¼
Pn
i¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞ  a=PðBiÞÞ
B0ðX0  PðX0jB0Þ  a=PðB0ÞÞ ¼
Pn
i¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ þ
Pn
i¼1siðBi _ B0ÞðZi  PðZijBi _ B0ÞÞ  B0ðX0  PðX0jB0ÞÞ, where Zi ¼
aðB0=PðB0Þ  Bi=PðBiÞÞ and PðZijBi _ B0Þ ¼ aðPðB0jBi _ B0Þ=PðB0Þ  PðBijBi _ B0Þ=PðBiÞÞ ¼ að1=PðBi _ B0Þ 1=PðBi _ B0ÞÞ ¼ 0 is,
by (3), the only coherent extension of P on ZijBi _ B0, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. In terms of P, the gain G is still conditioned on B, because B is
also the logical sum of the new conditioning events: B ¼ Wni¼1Bi _Wni¼1ðBi _ B0Þ _ B0. It follows supGjBP 0 by dF-coherence
of P.
The proof of the second part of the proposition follows at once from noting that when XjB ¼ 0jB (15) reduces to
Pð0jBÞ ¼ infP2P aðPÞPðBÞ
n o
. h
Theorem 1 is not a characterisation theorem, and cannot obviously be applied to arbitrary D and E. One reason for pre-
senting it is that it supplies us with a way of assessing centered convex previsions in the particular, but important case that
PðBÞ > 0, 8 B 2 B, 8 P 2 P.
Another motivation is that it informs us, through (15), about the type of functions upon which the inﬁmum is performed.
Convexity requires adding a term /PðBÞ to any dF-coherent prevision PðXjBÞ. This term is equal to aðPÞPðBÞ in Theorem 1. If P is
unconditional, it reduces to aðPÞ, if it is W-coherent, /P 	 0, and we come to the familiar envelope theorems in [26,29].
An envelope theorem which characterises centered convexity is given in [15], Theorem 8. We do not report it here, but
stress the fact that its practical use is considerably less immediate than the envelope theorem for W-coherence. In fact, the
set on which the inﬁmum is performed depends on XjB in this theorem. Also the function /PðBÞ has a more complex structure,
which is inﬂuenced by the ordering of zero probabilities, for each P 2 P, among the possible conditioning events. Seemingly,
it is technically possible to circumvent such difﬁculties with W-coherence because the function /PðBÞmay be set identically
equal to zero there.
Thus W-coherence remains so far the most general concept for which (D) in Section 2.1 has a general practical as well as
theoretical signiﬁcance among those discussed in this paper.
5. Conclusions
We summarise our conclusions about the role of Williams coherence with the help of Table 1, where consistency concepts
for precise (ﬁrst) and imprecise previsions (then) are listed in order of increasing generality. Undoubtedly, a strong
motivation for adopting the variant of Williams coherence called W-coherence in this paper is its generality: it meets all
the properties we listed in Section 2.1, a feature shared by coherence for unconditional lower previsions and the root concept
of dF-coherence. Even the notion beyondW-coherence, i.e. centered convexity, while being more general (but weaker) under
many respects, fails to ensure a general envelope theorem of comparable ease of use. If we restrict our attention to W-coher-
ence versus Walley-coherence, we may conclude that whenever they are not equivalent (if they are we may adopt either
one) the choice depends essentially on our willingness to accept some conglomerative axiom, and some at a large extent
consequent domain constraints (acceptance of both items results in preferring Walley-coherence). Given that W-coherence
is more general than Walley-coherence, we may even use W-coherence in principle, and Walley-coherence under speciﬁc
circumstances, for instance when studying stochastic processes. This case copes well with the domain constraints of Wal-
ley-coherence, when we are interested in lower previsions like PðXnj^n1i¼1 ðXi ¼ xiÞÞ, where xi is a generic value for the random
variable Xi. In fact, the events ^n1i¼1 ðXi ¼ xiÞ form a partition Bn1, for a given n and by varying x1; . . . ; xn1 in all (jointly) pos-
sible ways.
Similarly, new information in statistical inference may commonly arise from a partition of possible hypotheses. Again,
this is a favourable situation to apply Walley-coherence, as for its domain constraints, and is in fact largely discussed in
[26]. It has also to be noted that cases where Walley-coherence ensures the existence of a (conglomerable) extension are
pointed out in [26], and that they are of a certain generality. In other words, the ‘not always’ at the crossing of Walley-coher-
ence and property (B) in Table 1 should be graded.Table 1
Some consistency concepts for precise and imprecise previsions.
Type of prevision (A) Structure-free (B) Extension theorem (D) Envelope theorem characterisation
de Finetti-coherence Precise, unconditional Yes Yes Does not apply
de Finetti-coherence Precise, conditional Yes, in later studies Yes, in later studies Does not apply
Coherence Lower, unconditional Yes Yes Yes
Walley-coherence Lower, conditional No Not always Not always
W-coherence Lower, conditional Yes Yes Yes
Centered convexity Lower, conditional Yes Yes Yes (with operational constraints)
R. Pelessoni, P. Vicig / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 612–626 625More generally, the theory of imprecise probabilities shows that there are often many alternatives for generalising famil-
iar concepts (for instance, independence) from theories of precise probabilities or previsions, and that frequently there is no
way to keep all the properties of the special precise probability case. Under these circumstances, we might want to employ
different concepts of conditional consistency, to preserve obtaining certain aims. A presentation of these conﬂicting in-
stances is given in [28], where some alternative notions of imprecise conditional probability are presented. A further inves-
tigation of the consistency concepts in the conditional environment should include also these aspects, as well as other ideas
developed in the literature. In particular, the game-theoretic approach in [20,21] was recently related to Walley’s [5], and
this could simplify the potential future work of relating it with Williams’ approach too.Acknowledgement
We are grateful to the referees for their constructive suggestions.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
We preliminarily recall a characterisation theorem, holding for W-coherent conditional lower previsions deﬁned on a
structured domain D [29].
Theorem 2. Let X be a linear space of bounded random variables, E  X the set of all indicator functions of events in X. Let also
1 2 E and BX 2 X, 8B 2 E, 8X 2 X. Deﬁne E; ¼ E f;g,D ¼ fXjB : X 2 X;B 2 E;g. P : D ! R is a W-coherent conditional lower
prevision if and only if:
(A1) PðXjBÞP inffXjBg;8XjB 2 D
(A2) PðkXjBÞ ¼ kPðXjBÞ;8XjB 2 D, 8kP 0
(A3) PðX þ Y jBÞP PðXjBÞ þ PðY jBÞ;8XjB;Y jB 2 D
(A4) PðAðX  PðXjA ^ BÞÞjBÞ ¼ 0;8X 2 X, 8A;B 2 E; : A ^ B–;.
As in the unconditional case [26], the concept of natural extension plays a fundamental role in extending P.
Deﬁnition 11. Let P : D! R be a conditional lower prevision, XjB an arbitrary bounded conditional random variable. Deﬁne
gi ¼ siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ, LðXjBÞ ¼ a : sup
Pn
i¼1gi  BðX  aÞj
Wn
i¼1Bi _ B
 	
< 0; for some nP 0;XijBi 2 D; si P 0
 	
. The natural
extension of P to XjB is EðXjBÞ ¼ sup LðXjBÞ.
It is easily seen that LðXjBÞ ¼ 1; EðXjBÞ½, a fact which will be used later. Moreover, the natural extension proves to be
bounded from above, when P is W-coherent.
Proposition 9. Let P : D! R be a W-coherent conditional lower prevision. Then EðXjBÞ 6 supfXjBg 8XjB.
Proof. Let c ¼ supfXjBg, nP 0, XijBi 2 D, si P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ. Since BðX  cÞ 6 0, using also W-coherence of P in the last
inequality, sup
Pn
i¼1gi  BðX  cÞj
Wn
i¼1Bi _ B
 	
P sup
Pn
i¼1gij
Wn
i¼1Bi
 	
P 0. This implies c R LðXjBÞ ¼ 1; EðXjBÞ½. h
Theorem 3. Let D be deﬁned as in Theorem 2, D  D and P : D! R W-coherent. Then E is a W-coherent conditional lower
prevision on D and EðXjBÞ ¼ PðXjBÞ 8XjB 2 D.
Proof. To prove W-coherence of E, we show that it satisﬁes properties (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4) in Theorem 2.
As for (A1), note that supfBðX  aÞjBg < supfBðX  inffXjBgÞjBg 6 0, 8 XjB 2 D, 8 a < inffXjBg. This implies
EðXjBÞP inffXjBg.
As for (A2), let k > 0 (the case k ¼ 0 is trivial), a 2 LðXjBÞ, nP 0, XijBi 2 D, si P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ, W1 ¼
Pn
i¼1gi  BðX  aÞ as
in Deﬁnition 11. Then, sup
Pn
i¼1ksiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ  BðkX  kaÞj
Wn
i¼1Bi _ B
 	 ¼ k supfW1jWni¼1Bi _ Bg < 0. This implies
ka 2 LðkXjBÞ 8k > 0, 8a 2 LðXjBÞ. Hence EðkXjBÞP kEðXjBÞ. The proof of the reverse inequality is similar.
To prove (A3), let Y jB 2 D, b 2 LðY jBÞ, mP 0, YjjCj 2 D, tj P 0 ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ, hj ¼ tjCjðYj  PðYjjCjÞÞ such that, deﬁning
W2 ¼
Pm
j¼1hj  BðY  bÞ, supfW2j
Wm
j¼1Cj _ Bg < 0. Preliminarily, write H ¼
Wn
i¼1Bi _
Wm
j¼1Cj _ B as the sum of four disjoint
events as follows: H ¼ B _ ½Wni¼1Bi ^ ðWmj¼1CjÞc ^ Bc _ ½ðWni¼1BiÞc ^Wmj¼1Cj ^ Bc _ ½Wni¼1Bi ^Wmj¼1Cj ^ Bc. Observe also that
supW1, supW2 are both non-positive, but never simultaneously null, conditional on each of the four events. This implies
supfW1 þW2jHg ¼ sup
Pn
i¼1gi þ
Pm
j¼1hj  BðX þ Y  ðaþ bÞÞjH
n o
< 0. Hence aþ b 2 LðX þ YjBÞ 8a 2 LðXjBÞ;8b 2 LðY jBÞ and
EðX þ Y jBÞP EðXjBÞ þ EðY jBÞ follows.
As for (A4), let XjA ^ B 2 D, W ¼ AðX  EðXjA ^ BÞÞ. To prove that EðW jBÞ ¼ sup LðW jBÞ ¼ 0, we show that
LðWjBÞ ¼ 1;0½. Given d > 0, it ensues from the deﬁnition of EðXjA ^ BÞ that 9 nP 0, XijBi 2 D, si P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ such
that, deﬁning G ¼Pni¼1siBiðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ and Z1 ¼ G ABðX  EðXjA ^ BÞ þ dÞ, supfZ1jWni¼1Bi _ ðA ^ BÞg < 0. Hence
Z2 ¼ G BðW þ dÞ ¼ Z1  BAcd ð6 Z1Þ is such that supfZ2j
Wn
i¼1Bi _ Bg ¼maxfsupfZ2j
Wn
i¼1Bi _ ðA ^ BÞg; supfZ2jð
Wn
i¼1BiÞc^
Ac ^ Bgg 6 maxfsupfZ1j
Wn
i¼1Bi _ ðA ^ BÞg;dg < 0 (omit the second argument in the maxima if ð
Wn
i¼1BiÞc ^ Ac ^ B ¼ ;). This
626 R. Pelessoni, P. Vicig / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 612–626implies d 2 LðWjBÞ; 8d > 0, hence sup LðWjBÞP 0. But sup LðW jBÞ ¼ 0, because 0 R LðW jBÞ: by contradiction, assuming
0 2 LðWjBÞ would imply, as can be easily seen, EðXjA ^ BÞ 2 LðXjA ^ BÞ ¼ 1; EðXjA ^ BÞ½.
Finally, we prove that EðXjBÞ ¼ PðXjBÞ 8XjB 2 D. If XjB 2 D, taking n ¼ 1, s1 ¼ 1, X1jB1 ¼ XjB in the deﬁnition of EðXjBÞ,
supfBðX  PðXjBÞÞ  BðX  aÞjBg ¼ a PðXjBÞ < 0, 8a < PðXjBÞ. Hence EðXjBÞP PðXjBÞ. For the reverse inequality, note that
8XjB 2 D, 8XijBi 2 D, 8si P 0 ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ, sup
Pn
i¼1gi  BðX  PðXjBÞÞj
Wn
i¼1Bi _ B
 	
P 0, by the coherence of P onD. It ensues
PðXjBÞ R LðXjBÞ ¼ 1; EðXjBÞ½. h
Theorem 3 lets us extend any W-coherent conditional lower prevision P : D! R to any set which meets the structure
requirements of D in Theorem 2. The set D0 in Proposition 1 does not necessarily satisfy these requirements. When it does
not, consider a partitionB on which the random variables inD0 are deﬁned and letX be the set of all random variables onB,
E; and D as in Theorem 2. By Theorem 3, E : D ! R is a W-coherent conditional lower previsions, extending P to D and
therefore to D0  D as well.
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